by Patrizio Ricci
The European Union is looking East. As its relationship with Washington deteriorates—fuelled by Donald Trump’s trade war—Brussels is taking a closer look at an old and ambivalent partner: China. The immediate reasons are clear. U.S. tariffs are hitting European exports hard and threatening to destabilize the entire architecture of global trade. In this context, the idea of a closer China-EU alignment is starting to gain traction.
Not by chance, EU leaders are planning an official visit to China at the end of July, with the declared goal of discussing a joint strategy with President Xi Jinping to counter American protectionism. The fact that Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa are preparing to travel to Beijing—after Xi refused an invitation to Brussels—signals strategic intent. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has already visited China, expressing support for stable and constructive relations.
In 2024, trade volume between the EU and China reached $785 billion—surpassing trade between China and the U.S. This reflects a deepening economic interdependence. Yet significant fractures remain. The EU still views China with suspicion, largely for ideological reasons. Brussels has repeatedly raised concerns about Taiwan, human rights in Xinjiang, and, more broadly, the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime.
This is not merely an economic divergence, but a profound cultural and political divide. Europe has rejected China’s overtures not out of pragmatic self-interest, but due to a firm ideological adherence to liberal-progressive Atlanticism.
Europe’s Many “Nos” to China
Examples of this distance are numerous. Take the gradual abandonment of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), signed in 2020 but never ratified—officially due to “human rights concerns,” but in reality also due to pressure from Washington.
Or the case of Italy: in 2023, Rome formally announced its withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s ambitious infrastructure project. Italy had been the first G7 country to sign a memorandum with Beijing in 2019, but NATO alignment and transatlantic loyalty prevailed.
The EU has also implemented protectionist measures against certain Chinese imports—such as solar panels and, more recently, electric vehicles—citing overproduction and unfair competition. Behind these moves lies both fear of deindustrialization and the will to contain a non-Western economic model.
A European Illusion?
In all these cases, ideology has trumped self-interest. This is why the current thaw between Brussels and Beijing appears more like a tactical maneuver than a genuine strategic shift. Europe has never seriously considered an equal partnership with China, but rather a conditional one, subordinated to non-negotiable ideological standards.
The truth is, the EU is not trying to distance itself from the U.S., but from Trump. That’s a critical distinction. What we’re witnessing is not an eastern pivot, but a message to the West: a signal to Washington, not a sincere geopolitical realignment.
Europe, in its attempt to show independence from Trump’s tariffs and unilateralism, is staging a performance of strategic autonomy. But the real target remains the “America First” doctrine—not China. If a progressive, globalist administration returns to Washington, Brussels may quickly abandon its current openness and revert to ideological distance.
This is not a paradigm shift—it’s a contingency plan. And Beijing knows it. That’s why it won’t accept the role of junior partner under Western norms. China is willing to invest in Europe—but not at the price of its sovereignty, nor on ideological terms.
A Strategy to Isolate Russia?
There’s also another dimension to this dynamic: the EU’s strategic interest in isolating Russia. Europe is not seeking a true alliance with China, but rather a transactional cooperation aimed at squeezing Moscow. Yet this calculation overlooks the solid ties between Beijing and Moscow.
China pursues a multilateral policy and will not be forced to choose between Brussels and Moscow. It needs both stability and growth—and won’t sacrifice one partner for another.
Conclusion: Europe’s Weakness in a Multipolar World
This is why Europe’s turn toward China doesn’t truly convince. Not because of Beijing’s intentions—which are clear, pragmatic, and constructive—but because of what Europe is: a fragmented, ideologically bound bloc lacking strategic vision.
In a multipolar world, relevance comes from dialogue, not dogma. But the EU seems more focused on reshaping the world in its own image than on adapting to it. And that, more than Trump or tariffs, is what could really shatter the fragile balance of the global geopolitical china shop.
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